Here is the deck for my presentation at 2010 JavaOne. It summarizes our experience and leanings in creating an identity foundation for eBay application platform (AP). In retrospect a lot of the lessons seems like "Motherhood and apple pie" but I suppose there is knowing and then there is understanding. Also what I have seen is that in general there is not a deep understanding (or even awareness) of identity architecture as a first class enterprise infrastructure among enterprise architect and software engineers.
Anyway, the deck is designed to be talked over, so simply reading it may not be as interesting.
Wednesday, September 22, 2010
Monday, September 20, 2010
LSE economist answers: "Why are terrorists often engineers?
IEEE Spectrum has an interesting podcast here title Why are terrorists often engineers.
Basically two hypothesis:
- Engineers are smart and high potential people and when/if they don't find ample employment opportunities they become frustrated
- Engineers have orientations toward hierarchy and order that is also a common theme with fundamentalism.
Also interesting (according to the LSE researchers) engineers are more religious and right leaning compare to others - one wouldn't guess that living in the Bay Area.
Basically two hypothesis:
- Engineers are smart and high potential people and when/if they don't find ample employment opportunities they become frustrated
- Engineers have orientations toward hierarchy and order that is also a common theme with fundamentalism.
Also interesting (according to the LSE researchers) engineers are more religious and right leaning compare to others - one wouldn't guess that living in the Bay Area.
Sunday, September 19, 2010
JaveOne 2010 Talk
Latest details I received from conference organizers today (it is kind of late, isn't it?) about time and location of my talk @ JavaOne:
ID# : S314414
Title : Login Failed, Try Again: 10 Best Practices for Authentication in the Cloud
Track: Enterprise Service Architectures and the Cloud
Date : 23-SEP-10
Time : 14:00 - 15:00
Venue: Parc 55
Room : Cyril Magnin I
ID# : S314414
Title : Login Failed, Try Again: 10 Best Practices for Authentication in the Cloud
Track: Enterprise Service Architectures and the Cloud
Date : 23-SEP-10
Time : 14:00 - 15:00
Venue: Parc 55
Room : Cyril Magnin I
what is a "Platform"?
Usually the answer to the question “What is X”, at least in the context of software engineering, is given in two different ways:
- What does X do or what is X supposed to d.
- How does X work.
The former is more of philosophical answer and the latter more of a pragmatic one. For example, “what is a service?” could be answered in one the two ways:
- A unit of functionality that is exposed thru a well defined interface and is loosely coupled to its consumers, it is autonomous, reusable, discoverable and stateless.
Or it can be answered as
- It is a unit of code exposed thru a WSDL and invoked using SOAP and it is language neutral
Those who know me know that I am more inclined toward philosophy. So when I attempt to answer “what is a platform?” – as I had to recently when we were building eBay Application Platform - I opt for what it does.
To me the answer is simple, at least in the realm of software engineering:
A software platform is any set of functionality that increases developers’ productivity, plain and simple.
Operating systems do that, languages do that, APIs do that so do IDEs such as Eclipse. So what is the difference between tools and platforms? Tools are not programmable, platforms are. In other words developers can “program” platforms to suit their needs. In other words tools are used to accomplish one task, platforms can be used (i.e. programmed) to perform different tasks. Some platforms start as tools (like Eclipse, Excel) but evolve to become a platform.
Why, besides philosophical clarity, is this important? It can be used to define a clear goal and metrics for success of whatever is called a “Platform”.
- What does X do or what is X supposed to d.
- How does X work.
The former is more of philosophical answer and the latter more of a pragmatic one. For example, “what is a service?” could be answered in one the two ways:
- A unit of functionality that is exposed thru a well defined interface and is loosely coupled to its consumers, it is autonomous, reusable, discoverable and stateless.
Or it can be answered as
- It is a unit of code exposed thru a WSDL and invoked using SOAP and it is language neutral
Those who know me know that I am more inclined toward philosophy. So when I attempt to answer “what is a platform?” – as I had to recently when we were building eBay Application Platform - I opt for what it does.
To me the answer is simple, at least in the realm of software engineering:
A software platform is any set of functionality that increases developers’ productivity, plain and simple.
Operating systems do that, languages do that, APIs do that so do IDEs such as Eclipse. So what is the difference between tools and platforms? Tools are not programmable, platforms are. In other words developers can “program” platforms to suit their needs. In other words tools are used to accomplish one task, platforms can be used (i.e. programmed) to perform different tasks. Some platforms start as tools (like Eclipse, Excel) but evolve to become a platform.
Why, besides philosophical clarity, is this important? It can be used to define a clear goal and metrics for success of whatever is called a “Platform”.
Tuesday, September 7, 2010
Authorization: One Step At a Time
In my experience authorization (much like identity and authentication) is a poorly understood topic by most engineers, architects and product managers. The prevailing narrative about authorization is magic box protecting a resource that knows every policy applicable to a resource and how to correctly enforce them, or at least know who can access the resources and in what way.
Both of these views are inaccurate (or partially true) and often lead to construction of single layer, complex to implement and impossible to manage systems.Authorization by nature is a hierarchical filtering mechanism; the operating keyword by far is hierarchical. The successful authorization systems are the ones that consist of several collaborating layers of authorization and filtering, each layer controls one dimension of access.
For example, imagine a company with a few departments: Executives, Marketing, Accounting, Sales and Product Development. Further imagine that each department has resources (data and services that operate on data) and applications (software users use to access services, view and manipulate data). In particular accounting has three applications: a data entry application, reporting application and a full book management application (web based or native app does not matter here). Here are the logical authorization rules expressed as typical requirement statements:
1. No person or application in marketing can access any resources in accounting
2. Data entry application cannot access account payable, any payment services or reporting services
3. Reporting applications cannot make any changes (write, edit) data
4. Full Book Management application can perform any function
5. Only Accounting manager can pay an invoice greater than $1000
6. Only CFO can run quarterly profit and loss reports.
Do you see the hierarchy here? Can you translate it to AuthZ system hierarchy?
Rule (1) talks about a large granularity “department”, rules 2,3,4 talk about applications and rule 5,6 talk about roles within a particular application or set of apps.
The first rule should be enforced thru a router or a gateway that blocks access to any application from marketing department. That is an effective isolation mechanism implement an authorization rule.
Second set of rules (2,3,4) should be enforced via a system level guard that only operate in request headers and tokens binded to them. Examples of such systems are ESB or pipeline style authorization handlers.
The last set of rules 5,6 should be enforced with an application level authorization system or guard that is aware of different roles within an application and their privileges vis-à-vis resources.
Now what happens if you collapsed three systems into one? Well in short the authorization system becomes complex to implement and tough to manage and three different layers with three different velocity of change would become one constantly changing piece of code.
The authorization system must scan everything in request, from originating IP address, to headers identifying calling application to payload determining parameters of operations. It has to understand a wide range of concerns from deployment (impacting IP addresses) to business logic ($1000 limit).
Authorization is tough but single layer authorizations systems like this are nightmares of manageability.
Imagine what would have happened if all checks at the airports (from entry to the terminal till when you sit in your seat inside the plane) would have been performed by the security officer upfront who today only checks your driver license and matches that with your ticket? At the airport there is three different levels: The guys who check your driver license and ticket, the TSA guys who check your bags and the crew at the gate who check your ticket and make sure you don’t sit in first class.
Both of these views are inaccurate (or partially true) and often lead to construction of single layer, complex to implement and impossible to manage systems.Authorization by nature is a hierarchical filtering mechanism; the operating keyword by far is hierarchical. The successful authorization systems are the ones that consist of several collaborating layers of authorization and filtering, each layer controls one dimension of access.
For example, imagine a company with a few departments: Executives, Marketing, Accounting, Sales and Product Development. Further imagine that each department has resources (data and services that operate on data) and applications (software users use to access services, view and manipulate data). In particular accounting has three applications: a data entry application, reporting application and a full book management application (web based or native app does not matter here). Here are the logical authorization rules expressed as typical requirement statements:
1. No person or application in marketing can access any resources in accounting
2. Data entry application cannot access account payable, any payment services or reporting services
3. Reporting applications cannot make any changes (write, edit) data
4. Full Book Management application can perform any function
5. Only Accounting manager can pay an invoice greater than $1000
6. Only CFO can run quarterly profit and loss reports.
Do you see the hierarchy here? Can you translate it to AuthZ system hierarchy?
Rule (1) talks about a large granularity “department”, rules 2,3,4 talk about applications and rule 5,6 talk about roles within a particular application or set of apps.
The first rule should be enforced thru a router or a gateway that blocks access to any application from marketing department. That is an effective isolation mechanism implement an authorization rule.
Second set of rules (2,3,4) should be enforced via a system level guard that only operate in request headers and tokens binded to them. Examples of such systems are ESB or pipeline style authorization handlers.
The last set of rules 5,6 should be enforced with an application level authorization system or guard that is aware of different roles within an application and their privileges vis-à-vis resources.
Now what happens if you collapsed three systems into one? Well in short the authorization system becomes complex to implement and tough to manage and three different layers with three different velocity of change would become one constantly changing piece of code.
The authorization system must scan everything in request, from originating IP address, to headers identifying calling application to payload determining parameters of operations. It has to understand a wide range of concerns from deployment (impacting IP addresses) to business logic ($1000 limit).
Authorization is tough but single layer authorizations systems like this are nightmares of manageability.
Imagine what would have happened if all checks at the airports (from entry to the terminal till when you sit in your seat inside the plane) would have been performed by the security officer upfront who today only checks your driver license and matches that with your ticket? At the airport there is three different levels: The guys who check your driver license and ticket, the TSA guys who check your bags and the crew at the gate who check your ticket and make sure you don’t sit in first class.